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Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to compare linear programming and stable marriage approaches to the
personnel assignment problem under conditions of uncertainty. Robust solutions should exhibit reduced
variability of solutions in the presence of one or more additional constraints or problem perturbations added
to some baseline problems.
Design/methodology/approach – Several variations of each approach are compared with respect to
solution speed, solution quality as measured by ofﬁcer-to-assignment preferences and solution robustness as
measured by the number of assignment changes required after inducing a set of representative perturbations
or constraints to an assignment instance. These side constraints represent the realistic assignment categorical
priorities and limitations encountered by army assignment managers who solve this problem semiannually,
and thus the synthetic instances considered herein emulate typical problem instances.
Findings – The results provide insight regarding the trade-offs between traditional optimization and
heuristic-based solution approaches.
Originality/value – The results indicate the viability of using the stable marriage algorithm for talent
management via the talent marketplace currently used by both the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force for
personnel assignments.

Keywords Assignment problem, Stable marriage algorithm, Solution robustness
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
At least twice each year, a group of assignment managers (i.e. human resource specialists)
from the U.S. Army’s Human Resources Command solve an army personnel-to-assignment
matching problem (APAMP), a problem wherein each assignment manager aligned with a
career specialty must pair ofﬁcers with personnel assignments. Each assignment manager
may consider the suitability of an ofﬁcer to ﬁll an assignment, an ofﬁcer’s preference for a
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given assignment and the alignment of an ofﬁcer’s developmental needs vis-à-vis specialized
subsets of the assignments related to career development. Optimizing a weighted
aggregation of these measures will yield a high quality solution to APAMP instances.
Such a problem can be modeled as a classic assignment problem, and the direct
optimization of the corresponding mathematical programming formulation will yield an
optimal solution based on the preferences and other inputs deﬁned in the problem
formulation. However, in the presence of uncertainty regarding the problem structure, the
addition and/or removal of elements from either input set will require resolving the
assignment problem. Such disruptions occur frequently within APAMP instantiations, as
ofﬁcers may be removed from consideration – or newly considered – for an assignment
because of personnel actions (e.g. curtailment of an existing assignment, extension in an
existing assignment and retirement) or unit needs (e.g. operation deployment and stop-loss);
assignments may become vacant (or ﬁlled) on short notice; or a speciﬁc ofﬁcer-toassignment matching may be directed to meet the needs of a speciﬁc unit or senior decisionmaker. These disruptions are referred to as perturbations or constraints on the original
assignment problem.
The solution to a perturbed APAMP instance may differ notably from the initial solution,
and a sequence of such perturbations may induce a level of chaos in the assignment process
(Hill et al., 2003), wherein each change in the ofﬁcer-to-assignment pairings results in a new
set of orders, an elevation of ofﬁcer (and family) stress and a reduced level of ofﬁcer trust in
the assignment process. Usual methods of solving these assignment problems, such as
linear programming, are notorious for often drastically changing solutions when problem
inputs change in even minor ways.
Thus, when re-solving the APAMP to address a change in the underlying problem
structure, we not only want high-quality solutions but also solutions that minimize the
number of changes to assignments resulting from instance perturbations, as compared to
the initial solution. We deﬁne the robustness of a solution approach as a measure of how
many changes to a solution occur when inputs to the problem change. As the objectives of
model robustness and solution quality may conﬂict, we examine Pareto optimal approaches
when considering the tradeoffs between these two objectives.
This study compares classic linear programming solutions to the Gale–Shapley (GS)
stable marriage algorithm (SMA) solutions as applied to instances of the APAMP. In
particular, the research investigates the tradeoffs between degradation of solution quality
and improvement in solution robustness when using an SMA approach for the APAMP.
This type of comparison is lacking in current research but is actually a critical component to
consider when implementing an SMA for assignment processing. The LP uses an objective
function based on preference values, the SMA uses a stability concept, but neither approach
explicitly enforces robustness.
This study supports ongoing implementation efforts within both the air force and the
army. The Army Talent Management Process recently completed, and many ofﬁcers
received preferred assignments (Rempfer, 2019). Assignment preference is a characteristic
important to the army (Army Talent Management Task Force, Headquarters, Deputy Chief
of Staff, Army G-1, 2019) that we examine in this study with the intent to provide results
that may inform future decisions about the adoption of algorithmic processes to improve
assignment outcomes. The Air Force is currently using SMA to support their assignment
process and is investigating issues related to preference matrix sparsity, something we look
to examine in a sequel to this work; this study focuses on the robustness of assignment
solutions using SMA for APAMP.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to
the matching problem, evaluation metrics that are typically used to compare solutions and
variants of the SMA with which solutions may be identiﬁed. Section 3 presents necessary
notation and sets forth the two categorical approaches used to solve the APAMP: direct
optimization of a linear program and the application of the SMA. Section 4 provides and
analyzes the results of a set of variants of the two solution methods over a representative set
of synthetic test instances, as they relate to solution quality and required computational
effort. Section 5 presents conclusions regarding the considered solution methods and
proposes directions for further research.
2. Background
The APAMP is a matching problem; it matches ofﬁcers to assignments to maximize some
criterion governing the quality of the matching. For readers familiar with mathematical
programming, the APAMP might also be viewed as an assignment problem.
Matching problems arise frequently. Ahuja et al. (1993) describe the classical bipartite
matching problem as a special instance of the assignment problem wherein the objects are
partitioned into two mutually exclusive groups or sets. The two sets of interest are
sometimes called men and women, as is common in an SMA, noted here as sets M and W,
respectively, each with complete preferences over the members of the other set. These
preferences are used to evaluate the quality of a matching solution. Bazaraa et al. (2010)
develop a mathematical form of the balanced assignment problem:
minimize

m X
m
X
vij xij

subject to

m
X
xij ¼ 1;

i¼1 j¼1

j¼1
m
X

i ¼ 1; . . . ; m;

xij ¼ 1;

j ¼ 1; . . . ; m;

xij 2 f0; 1g;

i; j ¼ 1; . . . ; m

i¼1

(1)

wherein vIJ is the preference (or cost) value associated with the marriage or pairing of man i
to woman j, and xij is a binary decision variable associated with the inclusion (i.e. xij = 1) or
exclusion (i.e. xij = 0) of that marriage from a matching. Note that vij need not equal vji, and
preferences need not be symmetric. Unequal cardinalities of sets M and W are typically
handled via the inclusion of placeholder indices or dummy entries that represent a null
partner with an appropriate null-valued assignment contribution to the objective.
Another approach to evaluating the relative quality of matching is to use a list of ordinal
preferences. Dean and Swar (2009) introduced the generalized stable allocation problem,
which uses ordinal preferences in allocation problems, but this area of research is relatively
unexplored in the literature. An open research question is the value of such ordinal
preferences compared to preferences deﬁned on a ratio scale. Such a comparison may be
useful when considering the use of ordinal preferences in systems such as the APAMP.
Some literature ascribes value to other measures of matching rather than just ﬁtness
derived from costs or preferences. Kimbrough and Kuo (2010) described measures of equity
and social welfare. These measures assign additional value to matchings that are somehow
more “fair” to members of each gender. They deﬁne equity as the sum of the absolute
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Table 1.
Comparison of social
welfare, equity and
stability

differences between the ordinal preferences of each match, and social welfare as the sum of
the ordinal preferences of each match.
To illustrate the difference between social welfare and equity, suppose there are two
men, {m1 and m2}, and two women, {w1 and w2}, with both men and women uniformly
preferring indices 1 to 2, with ordinal preference values of 1 and 2, respectively.
Observable in Table 1 is that, whereas the two feasible simple matchings have similar
social welfare scores, their respective levels of equity differ. Although such nomenclature
connotes speciﬁc meaning for this example, care should be exercised to determine the
applicability of these measures and their correct physical interpretation for a given
application and problem instance.
A more commonly examined matching attribute is the notion of stability. A matching S is
deemed unstable if and only if A (m, w) 62 S, such that both m and w prefer each other to their
respective partners within S (Teo et al., 2001). Such a pair (m, w) is called a blocking pair
(Dean and Swar, 2009). A stable solution admits no blocking pairs. In Table 1, we observe
that, whereas the ﬁrst matching is stable, the second matching is not. With a view toward
solving a matching problem, for any set of ordinal male and female preferences, there exists
a stable matching that can be found in quadratic time (Ahuja et al., 1993). Although the
literature on exact thresholds to deﬁne the related concept of “nearly stable” solutions is
sparse (Aldershof and Carducci, 1999), the relative stability of S is measured by its total
number of blocking pairs (Kimbrough and Kuo, 2010).
The literature on matching and assignment problems is quite rich, covering a
wide range of formulations and solution methods. To align with the current research
we have focused our review to highlight an important but sparingly covered
research area: matchings under preference and stability and the inherent robustness
of the returned solution.
The SMA, alternatively known as either the GS or deferred acceptance algorithm, is a
heuristic with the objective of ﬁnding a stable solution to a bipartite assignment problem.
The SMA is well-studied in the literature (Fırat et al., 2014). Gale and Shapley (1962)
originally proposed it to address the college admissions process, a matching market with
incomplete information, to reduce uncertainty for both colleges and applicants. Gale and
Shapley reduced the problem to examining potential marriages between an equal number of
men and women, each having ordinal preferences over members in the opposite set. For
reference, the GS approach is presented as Algorithm 1.
The SMA requires as input two matrices, each representing the ordinal ranking of
members of one set on the other (i.e. men on women and vice versa) (Ahuja et al., 1993).
These are represented in Algorithm 1 as prefm and prefw, respectively.
Of note, the solution approach to determine ordinal preference rankings affects
algorithmic performance. Faced with multiple choices (because of equal
preferences) the algorithm can choose lexicographical or randomly among the
competing choices within a given list. Each approach is examined in this study.
Regardless of this decision, either implementation of the GS algorithm yields a
stable solution (Ahuja et al., 1993).

Set of matchings

Social welfare

Equity

Stability

{(m1, w1), (m2, w2 )}
{(m1, w2), (m2, w1)}

2þ4 = 6
3þ3 = 6

0þ0 = 0
1þ1 = 2

Yes
No

Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for the Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage
Algorithm
M is the set of men, W is the set of women
For m [ M, w [ W: prefm, prefw are preference lists for each man, woman
S = 1; the pairs (m, w) in the current matching
procedure STABLE MARRIAGE (prefm, prefw)
while A m [ M such that (m, w) 62 S for some w [ W do
m / select m s.t. m 62 p,V p [ S
w / pop (prefm)
p / p [ S where w [ p
if w 62 p for some pair p [ S then
S / (m, w)
else if w prefers m to current match then
remove pair p from S
S /(m, w)
else
do nothing

By comparison, McVitie and Wilson (1971) developed a recursive algorithm that provides
identical results to the GS algorithm. For test problems of size m = 50, they demonstrated a
30% solution time improvement of the recursive algorithm over the GS algorithm while
using a programming language favorable to recursion. The McVitie and Wilson (1971)
approach also enumerates all stable solutions rather than just the single solution optimal to
the proposing set (e.g. male optimal).
When preferences contain some level of indifference (i.e. when one person has the same
utility for a match with multiple partners), the algorithm can accommodate an extended
deﬁnition of a blocking pair. Manlove (2002) explored two variants of the stable marriage
problem with ties. A weakly stable matching occurs when there are no blocking pairs that
are strictly preferred, whereas a strongly stable matching admits no weakly preferred
blocking pairs. Such a situation is easily conceivable within the context of the APAMP.
Perhaps the best known application of the SMA is its use by the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP). The NRMP implements the algorithm to provide stable
matchings of medical residents to hospital residency programs and assurances to each
program that their slots are ﬁlled, without requiring medical students to respond in an
unreasonably short time (Roth, 1984). The success of this particular application earned Roth
and Shapley the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics (National Resident Matching Program,
2013). Similar uses of deferred acceptance algorithms are noted for several centralized labor
markets in the medical community (Roth, 2008).
Leveraging the literature on matching markets, the Ministry of Education for Singapore
uses the SMA to match students to secondary schools using only student preferences and
scores on the primary school leaving examination (Teo et al., 2001). The distribution of
students among New York City high schools turned from lottery to a deferred acceptance
algorithm in 2003 (Tullis, 2014). In 2005, Boston public schools adopted a deferred
acceptance algorithm to assign students to schools based upon parent preferences while
balancing individual school requirements (Abdulkadirolu et al., 2005).
Applications of the SMA may also be found in modern information technology. A
generalized version of the GS algorithm provides a rapid method to establish a matching
between users and servers for content delivery networks (e.g. Akamai and Netﬂix). In
content delivery networks, there is very rapid change of preference orderings and
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constraints because of network congestion and network topology, both of which are timevariant. The algorithm provides a matching of geographic clusters of users to network
nodes that function as content servers that is stable over a short time horizon (Maggs and
Sitaraman, 2015).
The SMA has recently received attention for its potential military applications as well.
Hill et al. (2003) applied the SMA to the nuclear posture review, assigning a notional
nonhomogeneous supply of nuclear weapons to a list of targets. Unlike other applications,
they observed chaotic behavior of LP-based solutions in dynamic-systems not observed in
stable solutions, noting that changes may not be desirable when “adopting a plan already
under execution” (Hill et al., 2003). More recently, Naeem and Masood (2010) of the Pakistani
Military College of Signals explored the use of the SMA to model detected threats and assign
to them a probable target among a set of defended assets. This model enabled a larger threat
evaluation and weapon assignment process by quickly providing a robust estimate of likely
threat behavior.
Within a human resource context, there have been cases of LP-based approaches in the
assignment processes used within the services. In the U.S. Air Force, Wylie (2007) sought to
optimize the assignment of so-called rated ofﬁcers, those with aeronautical credentials. The
author used an assignment formulation that could be solved as a network ﬂow problem.
Recently, Lepird (2016) proposed further research to adapt algorithmic approaches for
identifying air force personnel assignments, using either an LP formulation or the SMA. Within
the U.S. Army, Sonmez and Switzer (2013) used an agent-based model with an ofﬁcer-optimal
stable solution, wherein side contracts could be chosen to receive a ﬁrst choice assignment.
Although the authors primarily investigated the matching-with-contracts paradigm, the
underlying model for their agents used a deferred acceptance algorithm.
The use of the SMA for personnel assignment problems such as the APAMP is relatively
underdeveloped. The army currently considers ofﬁcer and assignment preferences, whereas
the air force is more directly investigating the use of SMA to inform the assignment process.
The concept of a stable match does provide a nice “cost function” for the assignment
process, as both the ofﬁcer and the duty position are satisfactorily ﬁlled. However, there is
still much to learn about the subtleties of using the SMA for the military assignment process
and how to incorporate various factors into preference functions.
Herein, our study compares the LP and SMA approaches with respect to both the quality
and the robustness of attained solutions, an important examination not previously considered
in the published literature, but of tremendous utility in the ofﬁcer assignment process.
3. Models and general solution methods
This section provides the APAMP formulation under consideration. As an additional
complicating factor, the APAMP partitions assignments into “key and developmental” (KD)
assignments and “broadening” (B) assignments. KD assignments are deemed important to the
professional development of an ofﬁcer, and each ofﬁcer should have at least one KD assignment
during their time at each military rank within a professional career. Accordingly, we deﬁne the
following sets, parameters and decision variables prior to presenting our model formulation:
Sets
O
OKD
OB
A

= Set of ofﬁcers considered for assignment;
= Subset of ofﬁcers needing a KD assignment;
= Subset of ofﬁcers not needing a KD assignment;
= Set of assignments needing ofﬁcers to ﬁll;

AKD
AB
AD
OD
S

= Subset of KD assignments available to ﬁll;
= Subset of non-KD, broadening assignments available to ﬁll;
= Set of “dummy” assignments;
= Set of “dummy” ofﬁcers; and
= Set of determined assignments, called the Matching.
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Decision variables
xij = Binary variable representing the assignment of ofﬁcer i to assignment j;
bi = Binary variable representing ofﬁcer i in a blocking pair; and
zij = Binary variable representing the assignment of an ofﬁcer i to assignment j in a lower level program.

Parameters
|A|
|AKD|
|AB|
s
|OKD|
|OB|
yi
di

= Number of total assignments to ﬁll;
= Number of KD assignments available to ﬁll;
= Number of non-KD, broadening assignments to ﬁll;
= Number of ofﬁcers seeking assignments;
= Number of ofﬁcers needing a KD assignment;
= Number of ofﬁcers already having a KD assignment;
= Year group of ofﬁcer i from set O;
= Ofﬁcer i relative year group, di ¼ yi  minfyi g;

dmax
P
V

= Largest relative year group among ofﬁcers;
= Preference value matrix, pij, of ofﬁcer i to assignment j; and
= Value or preference, vij of assignment j to ofﬁcer i.

i2O

We note that O = OKD | OB and OKD \ OB = 1, while similarly A = AKD | AB and
AKD \ AB = 1. When the matching is unbalanced for a given instance, meaning |A| = s,
then either AD or OD is populated to a sufﬁcient level to produce a balanced matching. The
practical interpretation is that a dummy ofﬁcer matching to an assignment represents an
unﬁlled assignment whereas an ofﬁcer matching to a dummy assignment represents an
ofﬁcer who will not receive a new assignment.
The SMA typically refers to the matched objects as men and women. We emulate this
terminology for the APAMP and equate men to set O and women to set A. Thus, we can
represent the matching implied by each xij = 1 as (mi, wj) [ S, the matching of an ofﬁcer i (i.e.
man i or mi) to an assignment j (i.e. woman j or wj) within the complete set of assignments, S.
The LP and SMA use ordinal ofﬁcer-to-assignment preferences provided in matrix P. In
practice with the army, ofﬁcers may specify only those jobs they most prefer and those they
least prefer, leaving the remainder unspeciﬁed. These unranked assignments are referred to
as indifferent choices. To model indifference and completely specify P, an average value is
used; this computation is the average of the ordinal values that would have been assigned if
a strict preference were required. If starting at the nth assignment, an ofﬁcer expressed
indifference between some k [ N number of assignments, then the preference value is
calculated as given in equation (2):
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pij ¼ ðn  1Þ þ

k
X
j

j ¼1

k

¼ nþ

k1
X
j

j ¼1

k

(2)

For example, if ofﬁcer i has a clear preference over the ﬁrst six positions but is indifferent
between the four positions ranked as 7, the preference for each of those four positions is
calculated using equation (2) as:
pij ¼ 6 þ

1þ2þ3þ4
1þ2þ3
¼7þ
¼ 8:5
4
4

(3)

The LP and SMA also require individual assignment preferences over the set of ofﬁcers. To
inform this parameterization for APAMP, we deﬁne each ofﬁcer’s year group as the year of
their entry into commissioned service, adjusted for prior experience or for unusual career
advancement (e.g. promotion ahead of or behind peers during previous promotion boards).
Let yi be the year group of ofﬁcer i [ O, where di ¼ yi  minfyi g is an ofﬁcer’s relative year
i2O

group among ofﬁcers in the set O, and dmax ¼ maxfdi g is the largest relative year group
i2O

among ofﬁcers in the set O, which typically corresponds to the youngest ofﬁcers. Then, we
deﬁne a matrix of individual assignment costs in a matrix V, where vij is the scaled ordinal
preference assignment j has for ofﬁcer i, and is deﬁned as:
8
sdi ;
i 2 OKD and j 2 AKD ;
>
>
>
>
<
ð
Þ;
s dmax  di
i 2 OB and j 2 AB ;
D
(4)
vij ¼
>
ð
Þ;
ð
1=10
Þs
d

d
j 2 AD ;
>
max
i
>
>
:
0;
otherwise:
The ﬁrst condition in equation (4) considers KD assignments, for which it assigns a lower
cost (i.e. higher scaled ordinal preference) for older ofﬁcers (i.e. those having lower di-values).
The second condition considers B assignments, for which it assigns a lower cost (i.e. higher
scaled ordinal preference) for younger ofﬁcers (i.e. those having higher di-values). In the
third condition of equation (4), null assignments prefer younger ofﬁcers, albeit with a cost
that is scaled by an order of magnitude relative to the B assignment costs. Finally, a cost of 0
is assigned to all other pairings. For all vij-value computations, the value s is used so that,
when considering both ofﬁcer and assignment preferences in an additive nature, the small
range of preferences of assignments over ofﬁcers is not dominated by the larger number of
preferences expressed by ofﬁcers. From the corporate perspective, the army prioritizes
ﬁlling KD and then B positions, respectively, with ofﬁcers who should be aligned within
each category, followed by not assigning the youngest ofﬁcers to positions in favor of
assigning other ofﬁcers, because the youngest ofﬁcers have more time yet to serve in
important positions before their next opportunity for promotion. Beyond those preferences,
the corporate enterprise is indifferent among ill-suited ofﬁcer-to-position matchings.
We use four objectives for matching ofﬁcers to assignments. The ﬁrst measure matches
quality with respect to the usage of KD assignments, the second measures quality with respect
to ofﬁcer preferences, the third measures the stability of a match by giving the number of
blocking pairs and the fourth measures quality with respect to assignment preferences:
 Objective 1: maximize KD opportunity. Equation (5) prioritizes the full usage of open
KD assignments. A desirable matching assigns non-KD complete ofﬁcers to KD

assignments while minimizing equation (5), which prioritizes the assignment of
ofﬁcers with lower-numbered (i.e. older) year groups:
X X

f1 ðXÞ ¼

yi xij

(5)
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i2OKD j2AKD



Objective 2: maximize ofﬁcer preference satisfaction. Equation (6) measures the
quality of a matching by using the preference information of each ofﬁcer.
Minimizing this quantity seeks the greatest number of ofﬁcers receiving their
highest rated (i.e. lowest ordinal valued) assignments, assuming each ofﬁcer has a
complete preference ordering of assignments:
f2 ðXÞ ¼

XX

pij xij

(6)

i2O j2A



Objective 3: maximize solution stability. Deﬁne the indicator variable bi for each i [ O
as a blocking pair:
D

bi ¼



1;
0;

ðmi ; wj Þ; ðmk ; wl Þ 2 S; wl  i wj ; mi  l mk
otherwise:

(7)

Then equation (8) measures the number of blocking pairs present in a solution, where a
stable solution has no blocking pairs. To maximize stability, we want to minimize the
number of blocking pairs:
X
f3 ðXÞ ¼
bi
(8)
i2O



Objective 4: maximize assignment preference satisfaction. Equation (9) computes the
overall assignment preference level for the matching; minimizing equation (9) will
maximize satisfaction:
f4 ðXÞ ¼

XX

vij xij

(9)

i2O j2A

3.1 Solution method #1: linear programming model
Our linear programming model formulation for the APAMP is presented in equation (10):


lex minX
f1 ðX
XÞ; f2 ðXÞ þ f4 ðXÞ
x ¼ 1;
8j 2 A;
subject to
Xi2O ij
(10)
x ¼ 1;
8i 2 O;
j2A ij
xij 2 f0; 1g;
8i 2 O; j 2 A:
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A solution to equation (10) seeks ﬁrst to maximize KD opportunities and then, among
alternative optimal pairings, to maximize an evenly weighted combination of the
satisfaction of ofﬁcers via their assignment preferences P and the satisfaction of
assignments via their scaled ofﬁcer preferences V. This secondary objective is similar to the
social welfare measure of Kimbrough and Kuo (2010) in that it seeks to minimize the
collective, mutual regret incurred by a feasible pairing of ofﬁcers to assignments.
We reformulate equation (10) as equations (11) and (12), for which we can sequentially
solve equation (12) to identify the best attainable value of KD assignment usage, k*, and
subsequently solve equation (11):
X X
minX
ðpij þ vij Þxij
i2O
X j2A
subject to
x ¼ 1;
8j 2 A;
Xi2O ij
(11)
x ¼1
8i 2 O;
j2A ij

8i 2 O;
xij 2 f0; 1g;
where

k* ¼ minZ

subject

to

X

X
i2O
XKD

Xi2O

8i 2 O; j 2 A:
yz
j2AKD i ij

zij ¼ 1;

z ¼ 1;
j2A ij
zij 2 f0; 1g;

8j 2 A;
8i 2 O;
8i 2 O; j 2 A:

(12)

Within this study, the LP is modeled using the numpy Python programming language
package developed by van der Walt et al. (2011) and solved using the gurobipy package from
Gurobi Optimization (Gurobi Optimization, 2016b), invoking the commercial solver Gurobi
v7.0.1 for mixed integer programs (Gurobi Optimization, 2016a).
3.2 Solution method #2: the stable marriage algorithm
For SMA solutions, we consider the following formulation. The SMA is a heuristic and thus
does not need a speciﬁed formulation of the optimization problem. However, for
completeness of presentation, the following formulation represents the SMA approach:


lex minX X
f1 ðXÞ; f3 ðXÞ
x ¼ 1;
8j 2 A;
subject to
Xi2O ij
(13)
x
¼
1;
8i 2 O;
j2A ij
xij 2 f0; 1g;
8i 2 O; j 2 A:
The SMA uses matrix P for ofﬁcer preferences. The assignment preference matrix, not the
matrix C, is constructed considering:
 ofﬁcers needing KD assignment are preferred for a KD assignment; and
 among those needing KD assignments, ofﬁcers in the later year group are preferred.
Anyone familiar with military assignments will note that there are many other aspects that
could inﬂuence an assignment preference: ofﬁcer skill level, past performance, speciﬁc
experiences, time on current station, etc. For this study, these were not considered.

3.3 Test design
The data used in the testing was provided by the U.S. Army’s Human Resources Command,
and it represents preferences for 161 ofﬁcers over 139 assignments. Accordingly, we create
22 dummy assignments to balance the problem.
Table 2 lists the various solution approach variants examined to subsequently solve the
original, or base, matching problem and a problem variant created by augmenting the
original problem with randomly generated constraints intended to mimic changes that may
actually occur during the assignment process. LP and SMA, respectively, refer to the use of
either a linear program or the SMA as a baseline solution method. Cold Start begins the
solution process for the perturbed problem without a solution, whereas Warm Start
initializes the procedure with the incumbent solution from the base problem. As an
additional descriptor of the methodology variants, the term Randomized indicates that
equally preferred assignments in the data set are assigned distinct ordinal preferences
randomly, whereas Lexicographic breaks such ties by the ordering of assignments within
the list. When the algorithm is randomized, it may also be applied repeatedly with the
results compared, taking the best result of some number of iterations. This result is
determined either by the matching with the fewest number of changes to the incumbent
solution, “Fewest Changes,” or by the iteration with the lowest objective function value,
“Lowest Objective Value.”
The base problem is modiﬁed with the addition of problem perturbations or constraints.
For ten iterations at each solution variant approach listed in Table 2, zero to ﬁve random
instances of each additional constraint are generated. The incumbent solutions are then
compared with the ﬁnal solutions from the updated model and the number of differences
between the solutions is counted to compare the robustness of the SMA and the LP.
Development of realistic assignment scenarios for uncertainties faced by army
assignment managers led to the ﬁve types of additional constraints under review. While
selection of each scenario was experimentally controlled, the selection of the affected ofﬁcers
and assignments was randomized. Each perturbation was generated using the sample
function of Python 2.7’s random library for the affected ofﬁcer and/or assignment. This
implementation technique provided sampling without replacement with uniform
probability. The ﬁve types of possible perturbations typically encountered within an army
personnel assignment cycle are:
 Assignment restriction: An assignment restriction occurs when a subset of A
becomes infeasible for an ofﬁcer. In practice, such an occurrence happens when life
events cause an ofﬁcer to enroll in a program such as the Exceptional Family
Member Program or the Married Army Couples Program. These programs may
limit the assignment of an ofﬁcer, even to a desired posting. Another possibility
might be duty limitations because of injury or illness preventing assignment to
some units, such as airborne status or those deploying in support of overseas
operations. A restriction of this type is manifest via the imposition of xij = 0 for
ofﬁcer i and each job, j, deemed infeasible.
 Directed assignment: A directed assignment occurs when a particular ofﬁcer is
directed to ﬁll a particular assignment. Whether because of a by-name request from
a particular unit or the intervention of a senior decision-maker into the process,
these assignments take into account information that may not be routinely available
to assignment managers. This type of restriction is imposed by setting xij = 1 for
that ofﬁcer i and speciﬁc job j.

Parametric
analysis of the
army

99

JDAL
4,1



100




Rejected match: Because of how ofﬁcers are assigned to joint and interservice
assignments, also called joint and nominative assignment, some units may exert
inﬂuence over which ofﬁcer they receive by effectively exercising a “veto” power.
After an assignment manager “nominates” an ofﬁcer, a unit with such power
undertakes its own review or interview process before approving or rejecting the
nomination. A restriction of this type requires afﬁxing of the appropriate xij to
values of 0 or 1, respectively, to veto or accept the job j.
Unforecasted assignment: New assignment requirements sometimes occur. This
perturbation might occur because of unforeseen organizational changes, such as the
establishment of a new joint task force headquarters (e.g. combat operations). Life
events of an ofﬁcer in a high-priority unit, such as a new medical condition or legal
action, might also necessitate a reassignment to replace that ofﬁcer in the current
assignment cycle. Such a perturbation increases |A|, or A / A | {jnew}.
Removal of an ofﬁcer: Life events, such as medical concerns, legal trouble or personal
career decisions might impact the availability of an ofﬁcer for reassignment. Despite
many media portrayals, the army’s processes account for these in its reassignment
decisions. Ofﬁcers might retire in-lieu of a reassignment or request stabilization so
that a high school-aged child does not have to move to a new school for their senior
year. This perturbation entails either removing ofﬁcer i from set O (i.e. O / O\{i})
or setting xij = 0 for all jobs j for that speciﬁc ofﬁcer i.

Three response measures are used: solution time, solution quality in both problems and the
number of changes between the solution to the original problem and the solution of the
perturbed problem.
4. Testing, results and analysis
The ﬁrst comparison focuses on the computational effort required by each of the solution
approaches considered. Table 3 summarizes the computational effort for each solution
TM
R Core
i5-7200U CPU (2 cores) with
method as measured by the elapsed time on an IntelV
hyperthreading enabled running Ubuntu 16.10 in an Anaconda 4.2-managed Python 2.7.12
environment. Not surprisingly, the SMA heuristics run the quickest while the SMA with the
randomized selections runs the longest. From a practical perspective, all the techniques run
sufﬁciently quickly – in seconds – indicating that we can focus the comparison on the
solution quality and solution robustness characteristics.
Solution quality is the second metric of interest. Table 4 summarizes the results,
providing the solution methods, ordered by average objective function value and with an

Variant
LP, cold start
LP, warm start
SMA, randomized with cold start and fewest changes of 10 iterations
SMA, randomized with cold start and fewest changes of 30 iterations
SMA, randomized with cold start and lowest objective value of 5 iterations
SMA, randomized cold start and fewest changes of 5 iterations
Table 2.
SMA, lexicographic with cold start
Variants of SMA and SMA, lexicographic with warm start
LP under test
SMA, randomized with warm start

Abbreviation
LP-Cold
LP-Warm
SMA-10r
SMA-30r
SMA-5o
SMA-5r
SMA-Lex
SMA-Lex, Warm
SMA-Warm

indication of signiﬁcant differences based on a Scheffé multiple comparisons method. The
LP approaches clearly provide solutions with the best objective function values, and these
values are signiﬁcantly better than any of the SMA-based approaches. However, the SMA
solutions are still within 2.5% of the LP solutions.
As it pertains to the use of LP-based approaches, Table 5 examines whether using a
warm start helps with respect to solution quality. The results in Table 3 depict no
statistically signiﬁcant difference in computation times, and the results in Table 5 likewise
indicate no signiﬁcant difference in the resulting solution quality. With LP-based methods,
the average ofﬁcer preference in the matching S indicates ofﬁcers can expect their 16th
assignment choice. This behavior is pathological and is not uncommon to LP assignment
approaches; the LP is indifferent to the individual and focused on the overall metric.
Naturally, a more common metric of matching quality among assignment managers might
be the percentage of ofﬁcers receiving one of their top-three choice assignments, as shown in
Figure 1. We note that all of the SMA algorithms outperform the LP mode with respect to
this informal metric. However subsequent LP models could be tuned to narrow the gap. In
short, while LP models outperform when using the established objective function, SMA
models appear to consistently provide a greater percentage of the population with desired
assignments.
The ﬁnal metric of comparison is the robustness in the solution method; i.e. how much
does the solution change, given perturbations to the underlying problem? Figure 2
illustrates the mean number of changes to an incumbent solution for a number of randomly

Solution method

Parametric
analysis of the
army

101

95% Scheffé CI for mean times (s)

SMA, fewest changes of 30 iterations (SMA-30c)
SMA, fewest changes of 10 iterations (SMA-10c)
SMA, best objective of 5 iterations (SMA-5o)
SMA, fewest changes of 5 iterations (SMA-5c)
LP, warm start (LP-W)
LP, cold start (LP-C)
SMA, lexicographic (SMA-Lex)
SMA, randomized with warm start (SMA-Warm)
SMA, lexicographic with warm start (SMA-Lex, Warm)

3.0069 6 0.121
1.1289 6 0.034
0.6592 6 0.021
0.6592 6 0.022
0.6453 6 0.020
0.6404 6 0.022
0.2811 6 0.009
0.2744 6 0.006
0.2682 6 0.014

Table 3.
Computational effort
as elapsed time with
95% Scheffe CIs

Objective function value
Treatment

Mean

95% CI group*

SMA-Lex
SMA-Lex, Warm
SMA-5o
SMA-5c
SMA-10c
SMA-30c
SMA-Warm
LP-C
LP-W

72,780
72,460
72,400
72,380
72,380
72,360
72,240
70,980
70,960

a
b
bc
c
c
c
d
e
e

Note: *Treatments sharing a letter are statistically equivalent

Table 4.
Solution quality with
groupings from 95%
Scheffé CIs

JDAL
4,1

102

Table 5.
Solution quality LP
methods, with 95%
Scheffé CIs

Figure 1.
Percentage of ofﬁcers
matched to a topthree preferred
assignment

Figure 2.
Robustness (changes
to incumbent
solution) by method

chosen perturbations, where each of the three types of perturbations is equally likely to
occur. Table 6 provides the corresponding mean number of changes with 95% Scheffé
conﬁdence intervals (CIs). From these results, we infer very similar robustness qualities
among the LP-based and the randomized SMA approaches but a notable superiority of the
lexicographic SMA approach variants. Thus, as was found in Hill et al.’s (2003) study, the
SMA approach is quite robust, essentially limiting changes to the solution when the original
problem is perturbed.

Variant

Mean objective

Avg. officer preference

LP warm start (LP-W)
LP cold start (LP-C)

70,960 6 265
70,980 6 301

16.04 6 0.77
16.09 6 0.78

Based upon the observed data, a trade-off appears to exist between reductions in the number
of changes and reductions in objective function value. Lexicographic SMA and warm-start
LP are both Pareto-optimal approaches in a bi-objective comparison of quality and
robustness. For the two objectives of quality and robustness, an approach is Pareto-optimal
if changing approaches to improve one objective necessitates a decrease in the value of the
other objective (Ehrgott, 2006). Figure 3 compares the LP-warm, SMA-lex and SMA-warm
approaches along the dimensions of solution quality and solution robustness. For each of the
three plots, the lower left corner of each plot is the utopia point, optimizing both solution
robustness and solution quality. In addition to the comparative depiction of the tradeoff of
quality vs robustness for each of the approaches, Figure 3 also illustrates clearly the lower
variability in solution quality and robustness associated with the warm-start SMA
approach.

Group

Solution method

a
b
c
d
e

SMA, randomized with best objective of 5 iterations
SMA, randomized with fewest changes of 5 iterations
SMA, randomized with fewest changes of 10 iterations
SMA, randomized with fewest changes of 30 iterations
LP
LP with warm start
SMA, lexicographic
SMA, lexicographic with warm start
SMA, randomized with warm start

f
g
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95% Scheffé CI
for mean times (s)
84.40 6 6.94
76.52 6 5.06
73.80 6 4.73
70.51 6 4.12
62.31 6 8.18
61.64 6 8.24
48.89 6 8.76
10.79 6 5.12
10.39 6 4.76

Table 6.
Mean number of
changes with 95%
Scheffé CIs

Figure 3.
Developing the
efﬁcient frontier of
solution techniques
for mean solution
quality and mean
robustness
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5. Summary and conclusions
Personnel assignment processes are often based solely on the needs of the organization.
Recent initiatives attempt to provide greater consideration of personal preferences. The
organizations’ needs are also of importance, and so an appropriate compromise is inform
assignments using both the organizations’ and the ofﬁcers’ preferences. To this end, the
SMA has been proposed as a potential alternative solution method to the assignment
process and, in particular, the APAMP considered in this paper. Adoption of the proposed
assignment approach does require deeper insight into what the solution approach provides
in comparison to current methods. Within this context, this study compares several variants
of the traditional linear programming approach and the SMA solution approach with
respect to three performance metrics: solution time, solution quality as measured by an
objective function value and solution robustness as measured by the number of changes
required between a solution to the APAMP and the solution to perturbed variant thereof.
Whereas none of the solution variants examined are challenged with respect to required
solution time, the results from this study demonstrate that a tradeoff exists between the
quality and robustness of solutions when considering an LP vs an SMA solution approach. In
testing herein, an LP approach yields the highest average objective function value but requires
more changes to a solution when a problem is perturbed. By comparison, an SMA approach
using the incumbent solution to the original problem as a warm start attains solutions within
2-3% of the quality corresponding to LP-based solutions while signiﬁcantly reducing the
number of changes required from the original solution upon problem perturbation.
Interestingly, the APAMP is evolving in its application. In the fall of 2017 and for the
ﬁrst time, the Ofﬁcer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) of Human Resources
Command required all ofﬁcers being reassigned in 2018 to indicate a strict ordinal
preference over all available assignments. The ﬁrst use of these ofﬁcer preferences
completed in December 2019 (Rempfer, 2019). OPMD has likewise asked for units to indicate
some preference over the set of ofﬁcers. Such input requirements lend themselves to the
direct application of the methods considered herein, which portends a more stable
assignment process in the presence of the identiﬁed uncertainties.
There are a number of recommendations for extensions to this work. While using ordinal
preferences, the preference matrix used should be complete. Thus, a mechanism would be
required to allow ofﬁcers to fully specify their preferences while an algorithm would be required
for each assignment to fully specify its preference structure. We demonstrated an algorithm
using a subcategory of assignments (i.e. KD assignments) as an additional factor, and future
algorithmic examinations should consider additional factors of importance to assignment teams.
Alternatively, an examination of a continuous preference scale vis-à-vis an ordinal scale has
merit. In lieu of preference elicitation to achieve complete preference matrices, modiﬁcations to
SMA algorithms should be examined to accommodate sparse preference matrices. Whereas
traditional applications of SMA have some associated strategy-related proofs (Roth, 1984),
further investigation into the game-theoretic aspects of preference elicitation is warranted.
Finally, this study also adopted a strict pre-emptive goal programming formulation and
generated problem perturbations under an assumption of equal probability; either of these
assumptions might be relaxed upon further interviews with personnel assignment subject
matter experts to further reﬁne the respective solution approaches and modeling assumptions.
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